This paper argues that movements of youths in and out of their parents' homes re ‡ect an important channel of insurance against labor market risk. I document empirical evidence on the frequency and duration of such movements, using a newly constructed monthly coresidence panel from the NLSY97. This data is then used to estimate the structural parameters of a dynamic game between youths and their altruistic parents. The model features coresidence, labor supply and savings decisions and allows for …nancial transfers, shocks to preferences and substantial heterogeneity. Three sets of questions are addressed. (i) To what extent do labor market shocks account for coresidence patterns? (ii) How important is the option to move in and out of home as an insurance channel? (iii) How do coresidence decisions interact with young peoples'savings and labor supply choices? The …ndings suggest that labor market shocks account for over 70% of individual movements in and out of the parental home but less than 30% of cross-sectional di¤erences in coresidence. Moreover, coresidence is an important channel of insurance -more valuable than …nancial transfers and unemployment insurance but less valuable than precautionary savings. Allowing for coresidence movements provides a mechanism for rationalizing low savings rates and high labor supply elasticities for young males, and can account for observed patterns of consumption inequality. All of these average …gures mask substantial heterogeneity across the parental income distribution in the economic implications of parental coresidence. Ignoring coresidence interactions between youths and parents can thus lead to a mistaken characterization of the amount and nature of uninsured risk that young people face.
Introduction
Recent evidence has revealed that movements into and out of the parental home are a common phenomenon among young male workers in the USA. This paper explores the role of these movements as a potential channel of insurance against labor market risk.
The extent to which individuals are able to smooth consumption in the face of idiosyncratic income ‡uctuations has important implications for the design of social insurance policies, for individual labor supply and savings decisions and for both the level and distribution of welfare. It is thus not surprising that a large body of work has developed to assess the extent to which individual shocks are insurable. Two extreme cases of risk-sharing have been overwhelmingly rejected in this literature -(i) full insurance through access to a complete set of markets for contingent claims 2 and (ii) self-insurance through the use of a single risk-free asset 3 . This has led researchers to pursue an avenue originally advocated by (Deaton and Paxson, 1994) , that involves the study of economies featuring partial insurance. Such research has proceeded along two lines:
1. A "reduced form approach", whereby the extent and implications of partial insurance is quanti…ed, without any direct reference to the particular mechanisms that implement the insurance. This is the approach taken by (Blundell et al., 2007) , (Heathcote et al., 2007) and (Attanasio and Pavoni, 2007) .
2. A "structural approach", whereby researchers explicitly incorporate various "real-world" insurance channels into structural models and quantify their importance in determining behavior. Examples include …nancial contracts that are subject to limited enforcement constraints (Krueger and Perri, 2006) , durable consumption goods (Fernández-Villaverde and Krueger, 2007) , variable labor supply (Low, 2005) and bankruptcy protection (Chatterjee et al., 2007) .
This paper contributes to the second line of research by exploring an as-yet unstudied channel of insurance, that is particularly relevant for many young people around the time of entry to the labor market. This channel is the option live with one's parents, even after initially moving out of home.
In a companion paper, (Kaplan, 2007a) , I document new evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 that emphasizes the fact that movements both out of and in to the parental home are a signi…cant feature of young peoples'behavior. 4 In that paper I make use of monthly panel data on parent-youth coresidence to argue that moving out of home is not a one-way transition for many young males in the USA. Rather, it is common to experience a prolonged transitional period in which coresidence is determined by the realization of labor market 2 See for example (Attanasio and Davis, 1996) and (Hayashi et al., 1996) 3 See for example (Deaton and Paxson, 1994) and (Storesletten et al., 2004) . 4 There is a substantial body of anecotal evidence and popular press reports that suggest a recent trend in the USA for young people to move back home with their parents after a period of living away from home. This has led to the coining of the term "Boomerang Kids" to describe this group. (Kaplan, 2007a) is the …rst paper to provide empirical evidence for this phenomenon using panel data, and to relate these movements to outcomes in the labor market. and other types of shocks. Both the commonality with which youths move back home and the empirical association of these movements to events in the labor market motivate the hypothesis that the option to move back home may be a …rst-order important insurance mechanism for youths.
By studying the insurance value of parental coresidence, this paper advances a research agenda initiated in part by the …ndings in (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) and (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994) . Their results indicate that coresidence is indeed a common form of assistance provided by parents, and suggest that it should be explicitly considered together with …nancial transfers when analyzing the nature of parent-youth interactions.
Because it focuses explicitly on the experiences of young people, this paper is admittedly less general than other studies of insurance mechanisms. 5 However by focusing on a particular group of individuals, the paper makes a point that is overlooked by much of the existing literature on risk-sharing: that even if the overall insurability of shocks is the same for di¤erent parts of the population, the particular mechanisms that implement this level of consumption smoothing may di¤er markedly across sub-groups. The e¤ects of risk-sharing on other aspects of behavior may depend strongly on the way that risk-sharing is achieved.
I …nd that this is indeed the case for young males, with respect to individual labor supply and savings decisions. Allowing for coresidence interactions between youths and parents permits not only a better description of the insurability of shocks, but also sheds lights on the nature of many observed outcomes. For example, a number of recent papers have noted that business-cycle ‡uctuations of the labor supply of young people are larger than most standard macroeconomic models would suggest. 6 By recognizing that for many young people, the outside option when making their labor market decisions, includes the opportunity to move back with their parents, I am able to generate much higher e¤ective labor supply elasticities than if youths are assumed to make these decisions in isolation from their parents.
Similarly (Hubbard et al., 1995) argue that one plausible explanation for the low observed savings rates of low-income workers is due to the incentive e¤ects of means-tested government assistance programs. Explicitly modelling the option to move back home provides another plausible explanation. The additional insurance channel reduces the need for young people to accumulate savings for precautionary reasons and hence can rationalize low savings rates.
Finally, traditional channels of insurance, such as self-insurance through precautionary savings, may be less e¤ective for young people than the population in general, due to binding borrowing constraints and substantial labor market risk. This is particularly true for youths with low lifetime earnings such as those who do not go to college. For this reason, studying other informal insurance opportunities is particularly important for young people, if we are to adequately understand their lifecycle constraints.
The paper proceeds by estimating the structural parameters of a dynamic model of labor 5 In fact, the estimation restricts attention to youths who do not go to college -around one half of the relevant population. However, this is mostly due to limited data availability on coresidence for youths who go to college. Moreover, almost all of the anecdotal evidence and popular press reports about the movements back home refer to college graduates. Hence the importance of these movements in the current study is likely a lower bound on the importance of accounting for these movements in the entire youth population. 6 See (Gomme et al., 2005) and (Jaimovich and Siu, 2006) .
supply, savings and coresidence decisions that incorporates a repeated game between youths and their altruistic parents. The model is rich enough to be used to ascertain the extent to which labor market shocks are an important driving force for parent-youth coresidence outcomes, yet it is stylized enough render structural estimation feasible, with all the key parameters pinned down by the available data. The estimated model is then used to evaluate the importance of coresidence movements for individual decisions and as a means of smoothing consumption in the face of labor market shocks. Being able to estimate the stochastic structure of non-labor market shocks that a¤ect coresidence outcomes is crucial in this respect.
The main …ndings of the paper of three-fold. First, the extent to which labor market shocks are an important determinant of coresidence patterns depends on whether one looks at the cross-section of living arrangements or the within-individual time-series of living arrangements. Whereas less than 30% of cross-sectional di¤erences are accounted for by labor market shocks (the remainder is accounted for by preference shocks and non-labor market heterogeneity), over 70% of movements in and out of the parental home are driven by events in the labor market. This is an important distinction -it implies that the importance of parental coresidence as an insurance channel would be overlooked if one were to restrict attention to cross-sectional regressions or a static structural model. The intuition for this …nding is that there is a large amount of cross-sectional heterogeneity in the relative preference for living away from home, which is consistent with the similar observed earnings of youths living at home and away. However, shocks to preferences are extremely persistent: individuals are more exposed to sudden changes in their labor market opportunities than to non-labor market factors that in ‡uence the desire for independence.
Second, parents are a valuable insurance channel for young people, with coresidence forming a large portion of this support. This is particularly true for youths with poorer parents. For those with parents in the bottom half of the income distribution, coresidence constitutes virtually all parental support. For youths which richer parents, …nancial transfers are relatively more important. Overall, the option to move back home is more valuable than publicly provided unemployment insurance.
Third, allowing for shared residence has important implications for individual behavior. It generates higher labor supply elasticities and lower savings rates, and is consistent with the empirical patterns of consumption inequality in the Consumer Expenditure Survey. A key contribution of the paper is to highlight the fact that the option to move back home can have important implications for behavior for youths living at home or away, even if they never actually experience such a move. Simply knowing that this opportunity exists, causes youths to modify their behavior substantially: they save less and raise their reservation wages, relative to a situation in which this option is removed.
An additional contribution of this paper is that it is the …rst to estimate structural parameters of dynamic model of labor supply, savings and coresidence. This is a formidable task due to the presence of discrete (residence, labor supply) and continuous (assets, transfers) choice variables, strategic interaction and the large number of state variables. Estimation is achieved by using the quasi-bayesian estimator proposed by (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003) . That structural estimation is possible is important because it allows us to pin down the nature of unobserved preference shocks and non-labor market heterogeneity. These key parameters, which are not identi…ed outside the model, are the most important in quantifying the relationship between movements in and out of the parental home and labor market shocks.
SECTION ON RELATED LITERATURE TO BE WRITTEN
The idea that families have an important role to play in smoothing the impact of economic shocks to individuals dates back to at least the seminal work of (Becker, 1974) . That this support may come in the form of non-monetary transfers has also been recognized. However, the study of coresidence as a form of support has largely been restricted to the provision of support around the time of retirement and old age.
The work in this paper has strong links to a number of branches of the existing literature:
-Existing work on parent-youth coresidence: purely theoretical work and purely empirical work -Existing work on modelling exchange within families and inter-generational risksharing:
-Existing work on labor supply and savings of young people.
-Existing work on insurance channels -Existing work on structural estimation of dynamic model
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I document some key features of the data on coresidence movements and labor market outcomes for male youths who do not go to college. Section 3 introduces the economic environment and Section 4 describes the structure of a non-cooperative repeated game between youths and parents. In Section 5, I outline the estimation strategy, discuss identi…cation of the structural parameters and analyze the …t of the model. Sections 6, 7 and 8 then address the three questions that this paper answers: (i) To what extent are observed coresidence outcomes driven by outcomes in labor market (ii) How important an insurance channel is the ability to move in and out of the parental home? and (iii) How do coresidence decisions interact with labor supply, savings and consumption decisions? Finally, Section 9 concludes.
Facts About Coresidence and the Labor Market
In this section I document a set of facts about parental coresidence and labor market outcomes for male youths who do not go to college. 7
Data and Sample Selection
The data comes from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). This is a longitudinal survey of 8; 984 individuals form the cohort born between 1980 and 1984. They have been sampled approximately annually since 1997. The survey contains extensive information on labor market behavior and educational outcomes, together with detailed information on the youth's family and community background. In addition to the coresidence information described below, the data used in this paper include weekly labor market data, monthly education data and annual data on parental income. There is also annual data available on monetary transfers from parents to youths, although this is missing or measured with error for a large fraction of the sample. 8 The questions that make the NLSY97 an ideal data set with which to study the dynamics of parent-youth living arrangements, are a set of retrospective questions about monthly coresidence that were asked in rounds 2-6 (1998-2002) . At each interview, these questions asked respondents to list each period of one month or more in which they lived separately from each of their parent …gures. 9 Youths were explicitly asked to ignore periods of temporary separation from their parents due to summer camp. 10 From these questions, it is possible to reconstruct a monthly panel of parental coresidence outcomes for each respondent, which was then merged with data on educational and labor market histories. 11 A number of important selection criteria were imposed on the sample. The most important is that I drop all individuals who are ever observed to have attended college. This is done for two reasons. First, the college participation decision is almost certainly endogenous to the decision to leave or return to the parental home. Focussing on a sample of youths for whom we can condition on a decision not to attend college, allows us to focus on the interaction between residential movements and labor market events. It seems a natural starting point for understanding the economic implications of coresidence movements for youths and avoids the complications that arise from the interaction with college choice. Second, the fact that the monthly coresidence questions were discontinued in 2002 restricts the ages at which it is possible to observe contemporaneous labor market and coresidence outcomes for youths in the NLSY97. 12 The other important selection criteria are as follows. Females are dropped, as are males who ever go to the military or have all parents dead. A youth is included in the …nal panel from 8 For further details on the monetary transfer data available in the NLSY97, see Appendix XX. Many of the relevant data issues with respect to transfers are are discussed in (Pabilonia, 2001) . 9 A parent is de…ned in the NLSY97 as a biological, step, adoptive or foster parent. 1 0 The wording of the question on coresidence changed slightly across interview rounds. A typical question was worded as follows.
Since [date of last interview], has there been a continuous period of one month or more when you and your [mother (…gure)/father (…gure)] lived in di¤ erent places? If you were temporarily away at summer camp, but lived with your [mother (…gure)/father (…gure)] before and after that time, please include those months as months you were living with [him/her].
1 1 For further details on the contruction of the coresidence panel, see (Kaplan, 2007a) . 1 2 After 2002 (round 6), the retrospective co-residence questions were replaced with two questions that ask about the month and year that a youth …rst lived away from their parents, and the month and year when he/she returned home for a period of at least 3 months. It is possible that, as the cohort ages, these questions could be used to study movements back home for college graduates.
the …rst month after they stop attending high school or after they turn 16, which ever is later. Only youths who have non-missing residence data are included in the …nal sample. Statistics on moving back home for other sample selections, as well as statistics broken down by sub-groups (e.g. race, high school completion) are reported in (Kaplan, 2007a) . The …nal sample consists of 25; 526 month-youth observations, for 976 male youths ranging in age from 16 to 23. These generate 251 spells back home, where a spell is de…ned as one that is not left censored.
Coresidence Statistics
The left panel in Figure 1 shows how the fraction of the sample living away from home changes from ages 16:5 to 22:5. Over these 6 years, the fraction living away from their parents increases roughly linearly, from just under 20% to just over 50%. It may seem surprising that the fraction away is not 0 at age 16:5. This is because the sample selection conditions on youths who have already completed their education. Because the decision to stop school is closely related to the decision to move out of home, a selection e¤ect is introduced, whereby those youths in the sample at ages 16 17 are more likely to be living away than other males of that age. These are youths that are already living away from home when they enter the sample.
Presumably, the fraction that lives away from their parents will continue to increase as the cohort of individuals age. However, it may take some time to reach 100%. Evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the Current Population Survey suggests that for older cohorts, the fraction of males living away from their parents plateaus at 90% at around age 40.
The fact that even by age 23 nearly half of the subjects are living with their parents suggests that a substantial fraction of the sample may not move out at all during the sample period. This is con…rmed by the data in Table 1 , which shows that 50% of the sample are observed to live at home throughout the whole sample period while the remaining 50% are observed to live away from home for at least some part of the sample.
The main premise of this paper is that for many youths, moving out of home is not a one-way transition. Evidence for this can be found in the right panel of Figure 1 . This graph shows how the cumulative fraction of the sample who have experienced at least one movement back to their parental home, increases with age. By age 22:5, one-third of all youths in the sample have moved back home at some point. Again, the right-censoring of the coresidence panel prevents us from observing how big this fraction becomes as the cohort ages, but a lower bound on the fraction of youths who ever move back home of one-third is considerably high. This is especially true given the large amount of anecdotal evidence about older youths moving back home, that can be found in the popular press. 13 Of course to move back home, one has to …rst live away from home, and it has already been noted that half of the sample live at home in all the months that they are observed. Of those that are observed to live away from home at some point, we see from Table 1 that 44% are also observed to move back home for a period of one month or more. The evidence thus suggests that moving back home is indeed a common phenomenon, even for youths who do not go to college.
A unique feature of the NLSY97 data -that it allows for monthly coresidence data to be constructed -allows us to examine the nature of movements in and out of the parental home in more detail than has been studied in the past. 14 In particular, it allows us to answer questions about the length of spells back home, how the hazard of leaving home again changes with the duration of the spell back home and how the hazards of moving in and out of home are a¤ected by recent events in the labor market. Figure 2 reports the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the empirical survival function for spells back home and a smoothed estimate of the hazard of leaving home again, together with 95% con…dence intervals. The survival function reveals large variation in the duration of spells back home. Some spells are fairly short: 25% are less than 5 months in duration. But some spells are very long: 25% are 2 years or more. Recall that due to the nature of the survey question, a spell back home is only considered a spell back home if it is longer than 1 month. It is likely (although di¢ cult to con…rm) that there are numerous extremely short spells back home, of less than one month duration that are ignored altogether. In addition, a large fraction of spells (56%) are right censored, which suggests that durations may be even longer than those reported here.
An alternative way of summarizing the dynamics of moving in and out of home is to look at the hazard of leaving home again, as a function of the time since moving back home. This is shown in the right panel of Figure 2 . The hazard of moving out of home again increases for the …rst 10 months back home and then decreases gradually. The decrease in the hazard after the …rst year back home suggests that heterogeneity may play an important role in understanding longer duration spells back home. However an increasing hazard for the …rst 10 months back home is consistent with a story that emphasizes the role of …xed costs of moving and the labor market. Once they have moved back home, youths require time to accumulate the required assets and earnings increases to enable moving out again. This e¤ect is explored further in Section 5.2.
Labor Market Statistics
Since the subpopulation which is being considered in this paper (male youths who do not go to college) is not the typical group that is studied in the literature on labor market risk, it is useful to report some facts about their labor market experience. Figure 3 shows that there is a large amount of non-stationarity in the earnings and employment of this group over the age range from 16:5 to 22:5. Average earnings for employed youths approximately doubles, from $1; 500 to $3; 000 over this period and the fraction of youths that are employed in a given month increases substantially, from 30% to over 80%. This immediately raises the question of whether the increase in earnings and employment is an important factor in accounting for the increase in the fraction of youths living away from home.
In the introduction I argued that male youths may face a considerable amount of risk in the labor market risk. Part of this risk is re ‡ected in Figure 4 , which shows the monthly separation rate and the survival function for spells out of work. The data suggests that jobs are particularly fragile for this group: the monthly separation rate is around 3%, which translates to an annual rate of over 30%. Moreover, unemployment spells tend to be fairly long. The median duration out of work is 6 months, with a long right tail. Youths also face substantial earnings ‡uctuations when employed. Conditional on working, the monthly probability of an earnings change -either through a job change or a wage change on the job -is 23%. Of these, 58% are positive and 42% are negative.
Labor Market Statistics by Coresidence
Figure 5 provides a view of how earnings di¤er between youths living at home and youths living away. The left panel plots the average monthly earnings of youths away (green line) and youths at home (blue line) against age, together with 95% con…dence intervals. There are three things to note. First, the increase in average earnings over this age range occurs in both residence states. Second, the di¤erence between earnings at home and away, conditional on age, is fairly small -less than $500 per month. Conditioning on age is important when making this comparison, since the fact that both earnings and the probability of living away from home increase with age, induces a spurious di¤erence in the average earnings of those at home and those away. The third thing to note is that the average earnings of youths at home is initially above that of youths away from home, but this gradually reverses as the group ages. This point can be seen more clearly in the right panel of Figure 5 , which plots the away-home di¤erence in average earnings, together with a …tted line. Once can see that this di¤erence increases with age. Both the small overall away-home earnings di¤erence and the upward sloping trends with age, are features that the model presented in the next section will be able to generate.
It is important to note that the fact that the earnings of youths at home is very similar to those away from home does not necessarily mean that the labor market is not a driving force behind coresidence outcomes. The facts in Figure 5 are cross-sectional, whereas in Section 6 I will use the estimated model to argue that it is primarily coresidence movements that are related to labor market outcomes. In (Kaplan, 2007a) I estimate a series of duration models and make this point empirically. Moreover, to the extent that independent housing is costly, the labor market and coresidence are tied together through a budget constraint. This means that the empirical relationship described here can help shed light on both the extent to which parents provide …nancial support to youths and the extent to which heterogeneity and non-labor market shocks also drive coresidence outcomes 3 A Model of Coresidence, Labor Supply and Savings
In this section, I describe the physical environment and the set of allocations that are technologically feasible. In Section 4, I describe the timing protocol of a non-cooperative repeated game between parents and youths and outline the equilibrium concept that is used to choose among these allocations. 15
Demographics
Time is discrete and measured in months. I focus on the …nite period t = 0; 1:::T . The basic unit in the model is a family, which consists of a parent-youth pair. There are a continuum of families, indexed by j, each of which comprises of a parent (p) and a youth (y). In any month, t, the family can be in one of two residential states, labelled r jt 2 f0; 1g. When r jt = 0 the youth lives in the parental home and when r jt = 1 the youth lives in separate housing away from his parents.
Parents
Parents are assumed to have an exogenous constant income stream, I p j , which di¤ers across families. 16 Parental income can be used to to purchase consumption goods in the parental home, c p jt , and to make non-negative transfers, T jt 0, to a non-resident youth. It is assumed that c p jt is a perfectly public good within the parental home. The parental budget constraint is hence given by
Note that this structure implies di¤erent costs for the parent of providing a unit of consumption to the youth, depending on whether the youth lives at home or away. In terms of parental consumption, the assumption of a perfectly public good within the parental home implies that there is no cost to provide a unit of consumption to a youth who lives at home. However, for a youth who lives away, transfers eat in to parental consumption one for one. 17 It is straightforward to allow for an intermediate environment in which either there are economies of scale in the parental household (but c p jt is not a fully public good) or in which the price of transfers is greater than 1.
Youths
In each period, a youth can be in one of two labor market states: working (h jt = 1) or not working (h jt = 0). A working youth earns an idiosyncratic monthly wage w jt , which is the outcome of a stochastic process, outlined in Section 3.6.Youths who do not have an o¤er to work or who choose not to work at their o¤ered wage, receive an exogenous amount b. This should be interpreted as a simple public unemployment insurance program.
Youths can use their income to purchase private consumption goods, c y jt , and to invest nonnegative quantities, a j;t+1 0, in a risk-free bond which earns a interest at a gross rate R. In addition, a youth living away may receive a transfer T jt 0 from his parents. There is a per-period …xed monthly cost of housing, , payable by youths living away from home and a …xed cost of moving out of home. The per-period cost is meant to capture both direct housing costs such as rent and mortgage payments, and also indirect costs that may include utilities and other bills that are not payable in the parental home. The …xed cost of moving out is intended to capture direct moving costs as well as indirect costs that may include new furniture purchases and other durable consumption goods. There is no …xed cost for moving back home.
The youth budget constraint is hence given by:
Preferences: Youths
Youths have time-separable, expected-utility preferences, de…ned over consumption, labor supply and the residence state. Let U y jt denote the period utility for a youth from family j :
Period utility is additively separable between consumption, labor supply and the coresidence state. Total consumption consists of private consumption goods, c y jt , plus public consumption in the parental home, c p jt , for those youths living at home. The value of living away from home, z jt , is stochastic and di¤ers across youths. It is assumed to follow a discrete-state Markov chain with transition matrix z t . The disutility of working is constant and …xed at v. Lifetime utility for a youth is given by
where V T +1 ( ) is a terminal value function described in Section 3.9. Preference shocks, z jt , are assumed to follow a trend-stationary process, whose mean, E [z t ] = mechanisms are all related to the labor market experience of youths: (i) an increasing probability of working; (ii) an increasing earnings pro…le conditional on working; and (iii) asset accumulation. If E [z t ] were assumed to remain constant with age, the model would risk assigning an overly important role to the labor market in determining coresidence patterns. By allowing for ‡exibility in the mean growth, variance and autocorrelation of z, the model is such that in principal, either labor market or non-labor market factors could be the primary driver of coresidence outcomes. The features of the data that can identify these preference parameters, and distinguish between these two hypotheses, are discussed in Section 5.2.
Preferences: Parents
Parents have time-separable expected utility preferences de…ned over their own consumption and the consumption, labor supply and residence of their child. Parents are assumed to be altruistic, with a weight 2 [0; 1], placed on the youths lifetime utility.
where U , where is the (common) coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. This form of one-sided altruism has a long history in the modelling of parent-child interactions and has a number of implications for behavior. 18 First, note that when z jt > 0, both parents and youths have a preference for the youth to live away. However, since < 1, parents have a weaker direct preference for youths to live away than do youths themselves. This can create con ‡ict which will manifests itself in the form of multiple equilibria of a simultaneous-move version of the game described in Section 4, and motivates the need to specify a timing protocol for the game. 19 Altruism also implies that parents have a stronger preference for youths to work at a given wage, generating a second form of con ‡ict. Finally, altruism is the mechanism that is used to generate …nancial transfers from the parent to a non-resident youth.
Labor Market
There are two labor market states-working and not working. 20 Labor market shocks are assumed to be realized at the beginning of each period. I thus describe the structure of the labor market from the vantage point of a youth's labor market state in the previous period Not Working (h j;t 1 = 0) At the beginning of month t, a youth who was not working in month t 1 receives an o¤er to work with probably 0 . O¤ers are assumed to be drawn from a lognormal distribution log w jt N ( 0 ; 0 )
1 8 See for example, Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (1997) and references therein. 1 9 See Appendix XX for details. 2 0 The model does not distinguish between youths who are out of the labor force and those who are unemployed. However because the focus of the paper is on males who are not in college, this simpli…cation is of little consequence.
A youth who receives an o¤er may accept it and work in period t, or reject it and hope to receive another o¤er in month t + 1.
Working (h j;t 1 = 1 at w jt ) At the beginning of month t, a youth who worked in month t 1 at a wage w j;t 1 will …nd himself in one of three possible situations:
1. With probability the job is exogenously destroyed. A youth who looses his job in this way must spend period t not working ) h jt = 0.
2. With probability 1 the youth receives a new job o¤er which can either be accepted or rejected. If the new o¤er is rejected then the youth spends periods t not working. In other words, the youth does not have the option to stay at his current job at his existing wage. Conditional on getting a new wage draw, wages are assumed to follow a random walk in logs with drift.
Not surprisingly, d will be estimated to be positive, implying that on average onthe-job o¤ers represent good news, and youths face upward sloping expected earnings pro…les. However, there is some risk attached to the receipt of an o¤er, as new wages may be below existing wages. This feature is necessary to produce the non-negligible numbers of downward earnings movements that are observed in the data, without intervening periods of unemployment. 21
3. With probability 1 1 there is no change in the youth's current wage o¤er. The youth can choose to either continue to work at this wage (h jt = 1) or quit to the not working state (h jt = 0)
The labor market described here incorporates two types of risk, productivity and employment, in the spirit of (Low et al., 2007) . Note that conditional on remaining employed, all shocks to wages are permanent. The model also incorporates an option value to search, since not all new o¤ers while working result in wage increases, and new o¤ers can not be rejected in favor of existing wages. The equilibrium of the game between youths and parents will thus feature reservation wages that are a function of the other state variables and that interact with the coresidence outcome.
It is important to note that using data on wages and employment alone, situations 2 and 3 above cannot be distinguished from job destruction, when combined with a quit. Together with the fact that rejected o¤ers are not observed, this implies that the labor market parameters can not be estimated outside the model in a …rst stage and fed in to the structural model. Instead they must be estimated along with the other structural parameters inside the model. The parametric assumptions on the distribution of shocks help to achieve identi…cation. 22 Without loss of generality we can de…ne w jt = 0 as the state in which a youth does not have an o¤er to work at time t. De…ned in this way the history w t j completely de…nes the labor market outcomes for youth j. However, note that w jt is not a …rst-order Markov process since the distribution w jt conditional on w j;t 1 , depends also on h j;t 1 , which is an endogenous variable.
Government Insurance
I include two simple government-provided insurance programs, the parameters of which are …xed outside of the model. The …rst is a constant unemployment bene…t, b, which is paid automatically to any youths in any period that they are not working. The second is a consumption ‡oor, c, which provides a guaranteed minimum level of consumption. (Hubbard et al., 1995) have shown that minimum consumption guarantees may be important in reproducing the savings behavior of poor households. The consumption ‡oor is intended to capture the e¤ects of such programs as food stamps, medicaid and TANF.
Initial Conditions
A complete description of the model also requires speci…cation of initial conditions for assets, residence and labor market variables. The data reveals a substantial degree of heterogeneity in assets at age 16, a j;0 . As such, I allow for heterogeneity in the initial asset position of youths, with a j;0 assumed to be drawn from a lognormal distribution with a mass point at a 0 = 0. All youths are assumed to be living at home at t = 1, r 1 = 0. Note that this only places a minimal exogenous structure on r 0 , which is due to the …xed cost of moving out. Since r 0 is itself a choice variable, youths are free to move out in the …rst model period. An exogenous fraction of youths are assumed to have been working at t = 1, and their wages are given by a distribution that is chosen to match the observed distribution of monthly earnings at age 16.
Terminal Value Functions
Because of the monthly frequency of the model, it is not computationally feasible to solve and estimate the model using a horizon T that corresponds to the end of the lifecycle. Moreover, because our interest is on producing a good model of high-frequency behavior around the time of entry to the labor market, it is not clear that this would be a preferred approach even if it were computationally feasible, given the inherent misspeci…cation in any model of behavior. Instead I choose to specify terminal value functions and solve backwards from these. In order to minimize the impact of assumptions about functional form, I solve the model for an additional two years (24 periods) past the point at which I have data. 23 Note that because of the low estimated discount factors for this group, this minimizes the e¤ect of the form of the terminal value assumption. 24 I make the assumption that at t = T , the interaction between parents and youths ceases and no more transfers are made. At this point, all youths still living at home are forced to move out. In addition, I assume that labor supply becomes inelastic and that there is no further uncertainty about future wages. These assumptions are su¢ cient to obtain closed form solutions for the value functions, which I use as the terminal functions. 25 
A Non-Cooperative Repeated Game
The stochastic process for labor market variables (w t ), preference shocks (z t ) and the interest rate, R, are given exogenously. An allocation in this environment, s, is de…ned to be a sequence of functions that map histories of labor market outcomes and preference shocks, w t ; z t , initial conditions fa 0 ; w 1 ; h 1; r 1 g and heterogeneity in parental income fI p g into values for fr t ; h t ; c p t ; c y t ; T t ; a t+1 g. An allocation is technologically feasible if it satis…es the parental budget constraint (1), the youth budget constraint (2) and the non-negativity constraints for assets and transfers. The set of technologically feasible allocations is denoted by S.
There are a number of reasonable ways in which allocations could be determined in this environment. As a benchmark case, I consider a decentralized approach, whereby a timing protocol and equilibrium concept are speci…ed, and parents and youths make strategic decisions to maximize their discounted expected lifetime welfare. However, in Appendix XX I describe an alternate approach whereby instead, a family social planner is posited and attention is restricted to the subset of S which is Pareto-e¢ cient between youths and parents. It turns out that estimates from this Pareto-e¢ cient model are very similar to those from the non-cooperative game, and none of the quantitative conclusions are a¤ected. For this reason, and due to space limitations, I relegate these results to an online appendix and focus on the decentralized environment in the main text.
The environment described in section 3 has a natural interpretation as a stochastic repeated game in which action sets in the stage game are conditioned on a state vector that consists of the current asset position, a t , the residence state in the previous period, r t 1 , and the realized values of the two shocks (w t ; z t ). 26 In each repetition of the stage game, the youth chooses whether to reside at home or away, whether to work and how much to save and consume. The parent chooses public household consumption and the level of monetary transfers to be paid if the youth lives away. The distribution of (w t+1 ; z t+1 ) is determined by (h t; w t ; z t ). The equilibrium concept that I propose is that of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), in which all actions are conditioned on only the pay-o¤ relevant states, (a t ; r t 1 ; w t ; z t ). 27 The structure of the game is summarized in Table 2 .
In order to guarantee uniqueness of the MPE, I impose a particular extensive form of the stage game which speci…es the order in which parents and youths make their decisions. Attention is then restricted to the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of this sequential stage game. The assumed timing is as follows. First, the current state (a t ; r t 1 ; w t ; z t ) is observed. Then the youth chooses whether to live at home or away (r t ). If the youth chooses to live away from home, the parent chooses a monetary transfer, T t , to the non-resident youth. Finally, the youth makes his current period labor supply, h t , and consumption-savings decision, (c y t ; a t+1 ). The sequence of the stage game is illustrated in Figure 6 and Table 3 .
One reason for specifying a timing protocol for the stage game is that the simultaneousmove version frequently contains multiple Nash equilibria. This is most easily demonstrated in a one-shot version of the game with exogenous labor supply, analyzed in Appendix XX. In this simpli…ed version, the only decisions are the residence state (r t ) chosen by the youth, and a transfer (T t ) if the youth lives away, chosen by the parent. The intuition for the appearance of multiple equilibria is that due to imperfect altruism ( < 1) parents have a weaker direct preference for the away state than youths. This generates values for preferences, z, such that the youth prefers an equilibrium in which he lives away and receives the resulting optimal transfer, while the parent prefers an equilibrium in which the youth is induced to stay at home by the (non-credible) threat of low transfers if he were to move out. However with the assumed timing protocol, such equilibria are not sub-game perfect and ruled out.
The MPE of this game can be described by a set of Bellman equations. De…ne Y m t (x m t ) and P m t (x m t ) as the expected discounted value along the equilibrium path at the beginning of phase m of the period t stage game, for the youth and the parent, respectively. The four phases of the stage game, and the corresponding state variable, x m t , are outlined in Table 3 . Optimal decisions for the youth and the parent are denoted with a star ( ). The value functions for the youth are given in equations (3) to (5). (3) is the expected value at the beginning of period t, before the current period shocks have been realized, (4) describes the discrete residence decision, taking into account the equilibrium transfer strategy of the parent and (5) is the labor supply and savings decision, which takes into account future values along the equilibrium path, summarized in Y 1 t+1 x 1 t+1 .
subject to : c y t + a t+1 = w t h t + Ra t + T t r t 1 rt6 =r t 1
Equations (6) to (8) describe the problem faced by a parent along the equilibrium path. (6) this class of equilbria could not be expected to impact strongly on the results. Moreover, although the results in Abreu, Pearce and Staccheti () could be applied to compute such equilibria, the computational di¢ culties would render estimation infeasible.
is the expected value for the parent at the beginning of period t, which depends on the residence choice of the youth. (7) is the optimal transfer decision if the youth lives away, which takes into account the induced labor supply and savings decisions of the youth as well as the residence decision in the following period. If the youth lives at home, no decision is made by the parent in phase 3.
wt;zt P 3 t a t ; r t 1 ; r t x 2 t ; w t ; z t Pr (w t jw t 1 ; h t 1 ) Pr (z t jz t 1 ) (6) P 3 (a t ; r t 1 ; 1; w t ; z t ) = max
There is no analytic solution to this game, hence the MPE must be computed numerically, through backward induction. Nonetheless, a number of features of the equilibrium can be described qualitatively. First, there are four features of the model that help to generate increasing fraction of youths livings away from home: (i) increasing earnings pro…le; (ii) increasing probability of employment through search; (ii) asset accumulation; and (iv) non-stationary preference shocks. Second, there are two distinct classes of reasons why a youth may move back home: (i) labor-market shocks that include job loss, wage drops and lower than expect earnings growth; and (ii) non-labor market shocks (z). However that the dynamics of residence outcomes for these two types of shocks are likely to be di¤erent. Because of the ability to run down assets, a labor market shock may lead to a move back in a subsequent period, rather than in the same period in which the shock occurred. However preference shocks, if they lead to move back home, are likely to do so in the current period. Third, other things equal, parental transfers decrease and the probability of living away increases in the youths earnings. Fourth, the e¤ect of parental income on the likelihood that a youth lives away from home is ambiguous, and depends on the value of z. On the one hand, higher parental income generates higher parental transfers and hence a lower earnings/assets thresholds for the youth to live away. On the other hand, higher parental income leads to higher consumption in the parental home, making living at home a more attractive option for the youth.
There are two reasons for modelling parent-youth interactions in terms of a repeated game. First, it is intuitive and generates some outcomes that appeal to introspection about the nature of parent-youth interactions. For example, parents may make substantial transfers even if they would prefer the youth to live at home. Also, parents can not control the labor supply and savings of non-resident youths directly, but can partially in ‡uence it through …nancial transfers. If a youth has a strong enough preference for independence, he will move out regardless of the parent's actions.
Second, it is useful to be able to connect with the existing literature on parent-youth interactions, which has predominantly used a game-theoretic approach to model behavior. Games with a similar structure to the one analyzed here are used in (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) , (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994) , (Ermisch and Di Salvo, 1997) and (Becker et al., 2002) . However, note that in contrast to the model in (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) and (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1994) , I specify that it is the youth, rather than the parent who makes the residence decision.
One exception to the above is the static model estimated by (McElroy, 1985) , which assumes cooperative Nash bargaining as the determinant of coresidence outcomes. Another exception is the model of Pareto-e¢ cient allocations outlined Appendix XX. Although both the Paretoe¢ cient model and the game yield similar parameter estimates and quantitative conclusions, there are two reasons why in principal the two approach could yield di¤erent outcomes. First, the equilibria of the game need not be e¢ cient, even in a simple static version of the game. 28 Second even in the cases where the equilibrium is Pareto-e¢ cient, in general it generates a di¤erent point on the Pareto frontier between parents and youths.
Estimation

Strategy
A number of features make computation and structural estimation of this model di¢ cult. The model incorporates strategic behavior, which means that two sets of Bellman equations must be solved simultaneously, each taking as input the optimal decisions from the other. The model also includes a combination of discrete and continuous choice and state variables, a combination which is well known to cause computational di¢ culties. Both the discrete residence and labor supply choices can generate non-convexities in the decision problem for assets, even once current period choices of both the youth and the parent are conditioned on. This is due to the presence of discrete future choices. 29 Nonetheless, for the purpose of this exercise it is important that certain parameters are estimated and not set arbitrarily. Some of the most crucial parameters -particularly the stochastic process for preference shocks, z, and the altruism factor, -are not easily identi…ed outside the model and would be di¢ cult or impossible to calibrate externally. Moreover, di¤erent values for these parameters have very di¤erent implications for the role of the labor market in determining coresidence outcomes and the importance of coresidence as insurance. The necessity of estimating the labor market parameters within the context of the model has already been mentioned in Section 3.6.
For some other parameters, however, structural estimation inside the model is less crucial. For example, the distribution of parental income, I p , is easily identi…ed from data on parental income in the NLSY97. Similarly there are plausible values for the coe¢ cient of risk aversion, , that can can be taken from the existing literature. As such, the estimation approach involves …xing some parameters exogenously and estimating the remaining parameters using a set of moments from the NLSY97. Those parameters that are set exogenously are shown in Table 5 , together with their values. 30 . The interest rate, R, is set at 3%; the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, , is set at 1:5; the monthly unemployment bene…t, b, is set at $300; and the monthly consumption ‡oor is set at $100. The monthly housing cost is set at the average value, including utilities, for youths in the NLSY97 sample living away from home. The distribution of parental incomes is consistently estimated from the NLSY97 data in a …rst stage. It is discretized to a four-point distribution, re ‡ecting average parental income in each quartile. The remaining 15 parameters are then estimated based on average moments over the observed age-range from 16:5 22:5. The full set of moments is shown in Table 4 . The philosophy behind using average moments, rather than age-speci…c moments, is to use the …t of the model in terms of its dynamics across this age range as an informal out-of-sample test of the mechanisms at work in the model. The estimated parameters are displayed in Tables 6, 7 and 8 and include the labor market parameters ( ; 0 ; 1 ; 0 ; 0 ; d ; 1 ), the preference shock parameters ( z ; z ; z ; z ), the altruism factor, , the disutility of work, v, the discount factor, , and the …xed cost of moving out of home, .
These parameters are estimated using a Laplace-Type Estimator (LTE) with a simulated minimum distance criterion function. Laplace-type estimation is a pseudo-Bayesian approach whereby a classical criterion function, together with a prior, is used to de…ne a pseudo-posterior distribution. Monte-Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) methods are then used to draw samples from this posterior. The method overcomes some of the di¢ culties of simulation based estimation that arise as a result of attempting to minimize a non-smooth function with many local minima and saddle points, over a high-dimensional parameter space. (Chernozhukov and Hong, 2003) show that the mean of the posterior distribution is a consistent estimator for the true parameter values and is asymptotically equivalent to the classical extremum simulated minimum distance estimator. Further details are given in Appendix XX 31 .
Identi…cation
Whenever structural parameters are estimated on the basis of simulated moments, a question of identi…cation naturally arises. Although it is not possible to provide an analytical proof that the parameters are identi…ed using a given set of moments, I address the question of identi…cation in three ways. First, I provide an informal argument that each of the parameters is identi…ed by a subset of the chosen moments and give some intuition for why this is the case. This approach should be persuasive, since it simultaneously delivers an understanding of why the available moments are su¢ cient to pin down the parameters. In addition, I follow two approaches that are accepted as reasonable in the existing literature -(i) I examine a numerical estimate of the Hessian of the minimum-distance criterion at the estimated parameter values and ensure that it is not singular; (ii) I verify that the estimation strategy can recover good estimates of the structural parameters using data that is simulated from the model. 32 The features of the data that pin down the parameters are as follows:
Disutility of Work (v) Conditional on values for the labor market parameters (see below), 3 1 For another successful implementation of this estimator using a simulated minimum distance criterion, see (Kaplan, 2007b) .
3 2 This second veri…cation will be ready for the next draft of the paper.
the disutility of work is identi…ed by the average fraction of youths who are working in a given month.
Labor Market Parameters ( 0 ; 1 ; ; 0 ; 0 ; 1 ; 1 ) Since this is a search model, a standard identi…cation challenges arises as a result of the fact that rejected job o¤ers are not observed. Identi…cation comes from a combination of functional form assumptions for the unconditional and conditional wage o¤er distributions, and the structural relationship between the disutility of labor and the reservation wage. The two arrival rates, ( 0 ; 1 ), are identi…ed from the probability of working conditional on not working in the previous month, the probability of earnings changing between two months, conditional on working in both months and the mean duration of unemployment spells. The job destruction rate ( ) is identi…ed from the probability of not working, conditional on working in the previous month. Given the assumption of log-normality, the four parameters of the wage o¤er distributions ( 0 ; 1 ; 0 ; 1 ) are identi…ed from the overall distribution of earnings conditional on working, the distribution of earnings conditional on having not worked in the previous period and the mean increase in earnings conditional on an earnings change.
Preference Shocks ( z ; z ; z ; z )
z The intercept in the mean utility from independence is identi…ed from the average fraction of youths living away from home.
z The variance of preference shocks, which determines the amount of heterogeneity in the relative preference for living away is identi…ed from the average di¤erence in earnings between youths living at home and youths living away from home. Recall from Figure  5 that the earnings of youths at home and away is very similar. If z = 0, so that all youths have the same preference for living away, then all coresidence movements would be driven by earnings and asset accumulation, and youths living away from home would, on average, have far higher earnings than youths living at home. As z increases, the amount of non-labor market heterogeneity increases. This additional heterogeneity reduces the away-home di¤erential in earnings. z is identi…ed as the amount of non-labor market heterogeneity that is required to match the observed away-home earnings di¤erence. Since this di¤erence is small, the estimated value of z is large. 33
z The mean growth in preferences is identi…ed by the mean growth in the fraction of youths living away from home from age 16:5 to 22:5. First, note that since average earnings, assets and employment increase with age, the fraction of youths living away may also, purely due to labor market factors. Second, note that a high amount of preference heterogeneity, z , will tend to ‡atten this age pro…le, since youths with high z values are likely to live away, and youths with low z values are likely to live at home, regardless of their age. z is identi…ed by the di¤erence between these two e¤ects: how much mean preferences have to grow to generate the slope observed in the data, given the values for labor market parameters and preference heterogeneity.
z The persistence of preferences is identi…ed by the within-person time-series variation in parental coresidence. Two key moments are used: the monthly auto-correlation of coresidence outcomes and the fraction of youths who ever move back home at least once by the age of 22:5.
Fixed Cost of Moving Out ( ) The …xed cost of moving has an asymmetric impact on coresidence movements: its impact on movements out of the parental home is greater than on movements back into the parental home. Hence, conditional on the auto-correlation of preference shocks and the arrival rates for job o¤ers, I use the mean duration of spells back home as the identifying moment. To see why this works, consider an extreme environment in which the …xed cost is zero. With no …xed cost to moving out, the duration back home for a youth who moves back in response to an unemployment shock will be similar to the duration of unemployment. The extent to which spells back home are longer duration than spells out of work, identi…es the …xed cost.
Altruism Factor ( ) The altruism factor is identi…ed by the average fraction of youths living away from home that receive positive transfers from their parents in a given year. It is straightforward to see that an increase in the altruism factor leads to a decrease in the wage/assets threshold at which optimal parental transfers become zero.
Discount Factor ( ) Given the distribution of assets at age 16, which is fed into the model as an initial condition, the discount factor is identi…ed from the mean level of assets at age 20. 34 . The extent to which assets are accumulated during these years, given the amount of risk that youths face and the implicit insurance from parental transfers and coresidence, identi…es the degree of impatience.
Parameter Estimates and Model Fit
The estimated parameter values for the baseline model are shown in Tables 6, 7 and 8. 35 The …t of the model, as a function of age, is shown in Figures 11, 7 , 9, 8 and 10. All of they key labor market characteristics are matched well by the model. The parameters that govern the degree of earnings instability suggest that young males who do not go to college face substantial risk in the labor market. There is a 4% monthly probability that a job is destroyed, which translates to an annual probability of just under 40%. However, this is compensated by fairly high job arrival rates: just under 25% per month whether working or unemployed. A new o¤er while working generates an average earnings increase of around 5%. Recall that there is no exogenous deterministic age-earnings pro…le in the model, so the steep rise in average earnings with age is generated through a combination of new o¤ers while working and increasing reservation wages. It is the increase in reservation wages with age that helps to generate the corresponding increase in the entry wage.
The annual discount factor is estimated to be 0:865, which is relatively low. This re ‡ects the relatively small degree of asset accumulation between ages 16 and 20, that is observed in the data. Both the increase in average log assets, and the distribution of assets at age 20, are well accounted for by the model. These are shown in Figure 11 . In section 8, I argue that one reason for low observed savings rates is the presence of parents as an alternative means of smoothing consumption.
The value for the altruism factor that is needed to match the fraction of youths receiving a positive transfer, is 8:9%. The …xed cost of moving out is estimated to be $1; 379, or about twice the monthly rent. The far right panel of Figure 7 shows that this generates a distribution of duration of spells back home that is very similar to the data. Note that only the mean duration, rather than the whole distribution, was used in estimation.
The model is also able to account for the other key coresidence statistics shown in Figure  7 . In order to understand which features of the model contribute to which of the coresidence patterns, it is useful to discuss the estimated values of the distribution of preference shocks, z. The average value of living away from home is most easily interpreted in terms of the number of months of disutility of work to which it is equivalent. Since labor supply and coresidence enter the utility function in an additively separable manner, the two disutilities can be directly compared. The estimates for z and z imply that at age 16, the value of living away from home for one month is equivalent to the value of approximately 5 months of leisure. This number increases to 13 months of leisure by age 22. These numbers seem intuitively reasonable, and suggest that for young males who are not in college, there is relatively little disutility from full-time work, but a large value to independence.
Another informative way to interpret the degree of non-stationarity in preferences, z , is to examine the extent to which it accounts for the increase in the fraction of youths living away home. The top left panel of Figure 12 plots the fraction of youths living away from home against age, in the benchmark model and when z is set to 0, with all other parameters left at their estimated values. Even when z = 0, the fraction of youths living away from home still increases substantially: to just under 40% as opposed to just over 50%. This implies that only around half of the increase in the fraction away is due to an increasing preference for independence. The other half is driven by purely economic factors: increasing earnings, employment and the accumulation of assets.
As discussed in Section 5.2, a large amount of heterogeneity in preferences, z , is needed to match the the very small di¤erence in earnings between youths away and at home. This di¤erence is shown in the top right panel of Figure 12 . Notice that the model is able to endogenously generate the increasing age pro…le of the away-home earnings di¤erence that is observed in the data. The reason is as follows. At young ages, the only individuals who move out are those with a very strong preference for living away from home (high z). To …nance their strong desire to live away from home, these youths lower their reservation wage and accept lower paying jobs than youths who are living at home. This selection e¤ect generates a negative away-home earnings di¤erence at the youngest ages. However, as the mean value of independence increases and youths have time to receive more o¤ers and accumulate assets, the mix of youths who are living away from home shifts to comprise of those who have received more favorable labor market shocks. The di¤erence thus becomes positive at older ages. However, the high value for z ensures that there are always some low earning youths living away from home, and some high earnings youths living at home, as is implied by the small overall away-home earnings di¤erence in the data.
The top right panel of Figure 12 shows the extent to which preference heterogeneity is important in accounting for the low away-home earnings di¤erence in the data. The blue dashdot line shows the value of this di¤erence when preference heterogeneity is removed completely by setting z = 0, and leaving all other parameters at their estimated values. Not only does the away-home di¤erence in log earnings become non-increasing with age, but the earnings of youths away from home is almost twice that of youths at home.
Next consider the auto-correlation of preference shocks, z . This correlation is estimated to be 0:988 at a monthly frequency, which translates to an annual auto-correlation of 0:976. Thus, although there is a large amount of cross-sectional variation in the relative preference for living away from home (indicated by the high value of z ) there is only a very small amount within-person time-series variation in preferences. This implies that although non-labor market heterogeneity plays a large role in explaining cross-sectional di¤erences in coresidence outcomes, they only have a small role to play in explaining individual movements in and out of the parental home. To illustrate this point, the bottom two panels of Figure 12 show two features of the data on coresidence movements, when preference shocks are shut down, but preference heterogeneity is retained. To do this, I leave all parameters at their estimated values, except for the transition matrix for preferences, which is replaced with an identity matrix. Hence individuals do not experience changes to their value for z over time. First, notice how a substantial fraction of youths move back home even when preference shocks are shut down. The remaining movements back home are due to labor market shocks alone -25% of youths by age 22:5 as opposed 38% in the benchmark model. Second, the e¤ect on the length of these spells back home is shown on the right. The fact that the average length of spells back home decreases, illustrates the fact that spells back home due to labor market shocks are shorter duration on average than spells back home due to preference shocks.
One area where the model fails to account for the data is in predicting the level of transfers, conditional on receiving a transfer. This can be seen in the right two panels of Figure 8 , which show that average transfers are about twice as large in the model as in the data. In part this is a result of the poor quality data on …nancial transfers in the NLSY97. The majority of respondents report transfers in bracketed amounts which may generate substantial top-coding. Moreover, only …nancial transfers or $100 or more are reported so a large number of small, frequent transfers may go unreported. In addition, a large proportion of transfers in the real world may be in-kind -such as the use of parent's car or the purchase of a meal or clothing for non-resident youths. The NLSY97 data does not include these amounts. It thus may be possible to interpret the di¤erence between transfer amounts in the model and the data as the degree of …nancial support that parents provide that is unmeasured. 36
Results I: What Determines Coresidence Outcomes?
In principal, the model is consistent with either labor market or preference shocks being the main force determining coresidence outcomes. Which of these is the driving force depends primarily on the nature of the estimated stochastic process for preferences. The discussion in the previous section suggests an answer: non-labor market shocks and heterogeneity drive cross-sectional di¤erences in coresidence, while labor market shocks drive individual movements in and out of the parental home. In this section I formally quantify these e¤ects by decomposing coresidence outcomes into the e¤ects of labor market shocks, w t , and preference shocks, z t .
One di¢ culty in performing such a decomposition is that coresidence outcomes in period t, are determined by the full history of shocks, w t ; z t . However, this history dependence is more important for coresidence movements that are driven by labor market shocks, than for those due to preference shocks. To see, this consider a negative shock to the value of living away from home. If this shock is large enough to induce a move back home, then the move will take place in the current period -there is no reason to delay moving back home. On the other hand, a youth who moves back home as the result of a negative wage or employment shock may not move back home in the period in which the shock occurred. Since the direct utility gain from being away from home is unchanged, the youth may …rst run down assets, or wait to see if a subsequent positive shock eventuates, before moving back. For this reason, it is simpler to ask what fraction of coresidence outcomes are accounted for by the history of preference shocks and to interpret the remainder as the fraction solely due to the labor market, rather than vice-versa.
First consider the cross-sectional variation in residence states, r t . This can be decomposed as V ar [r t ] = V ar E r t jz
where z t denotes the entire history of preference shocks up to time t. The …rst term is the "between" component: variation in r t that is due to cross-sectional di¤erences in the history of realized preferences for living away from home. The second term is the "within" component: di¤erences in coresidence states that exist even within groups of individuals who have experienced the exact same history of preferences for independence. The fraction that is not accounted for by preferences, and hence is driven purely by labor market di¤erences, is that due to the "within" component:
Intuitively, if two people are observed to be in di¤erent residence states at a given time, this fraction quanti…es the extent to which this can not re ‡ect di¤erent histories of preferences for living away from home. In order to calculate this fraction, it is necessary to calculate E r t jz t , which is a high-dimensional object. To do this, two approximations are made. First, the history is truncated after d periods. Second, I use a ‡exible nonparametric estimator for match the high fraction of youths who receive transfers) but that the cost of making transfers is extremely high (to match the low transfer amounts). Because the data itself is of questionable, I choose to stick to the original model and interpret the high transfers as including large components that go unmeasured in the NLSY97. the conditional expectations, E [r t jz t ::z t d ]. 37 The decomposition is reported in Table 9 for the whole population and broken down by parental income.
The results in the …rst row of Table 9 con…rm the informal argument of the previous section that cross-sectional di¤erences in coresidence are mostly due to preferences, with only 27% being account for by labor market shocks. This …gure, however, masks considerable heterogeneity across the parental income distribution. The fraction accounted for by the labor market decreases sharply as one moves up the parental income distribution. The intuition is straightforward: youths with richer parents receive larger parental transfers and so face a smaller drop in consumption when they move out. So youths with a strong preference for living away (who also have low wages or are unemployed) are more likely to move out if they have richer parents.
A similar decomposition for within-person movements in and out of the parental home can be performed by constructing three additional indicator variables: (i) an indicator for whether a youth moved out of home in a given period, conditional on being at home in the previous period (mo it ); (ii) an indicator for whether a youth moved back home in a given period, conditional on being away in the previous period (mb it ); and (iii) an indicator for whether a youth moved residence states in either direction (m it ):
Each of these variables is decomposed in the same way as was done for r it . Taking the example of mo it , the interpretation is to quantify how much of the fact that one youth moved out of home in a given period and another did not, can be attributed to the fact that the two youths experienced di¤erent histories of labor market outcomes, w t . The results are reported in the bottom 3 rows of Table 9 . In contrast to the results for r it , the majority of the variation is NOT accounted for by di¤erences in preferences: 54%, 72% and 77% of the variation in mb it , mo it and m it is driven by di¤erences in labor market histories, respectively.
Again, there is considerable heterogeneity across the parental income distribution. Youths from poorer families experience a much stronger link between labor market outcomes and movements in and out the parental home, than do youths from households further up the income distribution. For youths from the bottom half of the parental income distribution, labor market shocks account for 80% 90% of these movements.
The …ndings in this section emphasize that it is the dynamics of parental coresidence outcomes that are a¤ected by wage and employment shocks. This provides a possible explanation of why cross-sectional studies such as, (Manacorda and Moretti, 2002) , …nd only a minimal role for youth's labor market outcomes in accounting parental coresidence patterns.
Results II: Moving Back Home as Insurance
In this section I quantify the value of parents in general, and the option to move back home in particular, as an insurance channel. To do this I compute a new MPE that results from modifying the baseline environment to remove each potential channel of insurance. I then measure the value a particular insurance channel as the constant percentage reduction in consumption, relative to the benchmark equilibrium, which would make a youth ex-ante indi¤erent between that allocation, and the MPE in the modi…ed environments. This consumption variation is calculated separately for youths and parents, behind the veil of ignorance with respect to initial asset holdings. The reduction in consumption is assumed to be in e¤ect only during the period in which the youth is aged 16 to 23.
Let the expected discounted utility for the youth in the baseline equilibrium, from consumption, hours, independence and overall, be given by EY c , EY h , EY r and EY , respectively. Denote the expected discounted direct utility of the parent by EP , so that the parent's overall utility is given by EP + EY . Let the corresponding values from the MPE in one of the modi…ed environments be denoted with an m superscript. The value of an insurance channel for the youth, youth , is then calculated as
and the corresponding value for the parent, parent , is calculated as
The average values, and the values in each quartile of the parental income distribution, are shown in Tables 10 and 11 for youths and parents, respectively .
The model with the option to move back home removed assumes that youths can choose when to move out of home, but once they move out they are not permitted to move back again. The …rst row of Table 10 indicates that removing this option is costly for youths -equivalent to around 9:1% of consumption. This suggests that it is indeed an important insurance mechanism for youths. The cost of not being able to move back also increases as one moves up the parental income distribution, from 6:7% in the bottom quartile to 12:6% in the top quartile. This increase is due to the fact that consumption within the parental home is higher for youths with richer parents, hence not being able to move back entails forgoing an option to enjoy a relatively higher level of consumption. Of course, this e¤ect is partially o¤set by the fact that richer parents also provide larger transfers, which increase consumption away from home relative to youths with poorer parents.
That richer parents provide higher levels of transfers also drives the large di¤erences in the value of monetary transfers across the parental income distribution. These values are shown in the second row of Table 10 . For youths in the bottom half of the distribution, the baseline equilibrium yields very few …nancial transfers. Hence restricting transfers has almost no e¤ect on values. However youths toward the top of the parental income distribution are willing to forgo large amounts of consumption in order to receive …nancial transfers from their parents.
When both parental transfers and the option to move back are removed simultaneously, a youth becomes completely …nancially independent when he moves out of home. This means that he must face the full brunt of shocks on his own or through the use of government insurance and safety nets. Comparing the value of this equilibrium with the benchmark thus provides a way of measuring the total value of parents as insurance for non-resident youths, shown in the third row of Table 10 .
There are two points to note from these results. First, in addition to being a very valuable insurance channel (16:3% on average), this value increases steeply with parental income. This is due to a combination of higher consumption at home and higher transfers when away. Second, even though the value of the option to move back home is higher for youths with richer parents, it constitutes a much greater share of total parental support for youths with poorer parents. That is, the mechanisms that parents themselves use to help smooth their children's consumption when adverse shocks are realized, di¤er markedly with parental income. For example, parents from the poorest quartile provide almost all support in the form of shared residence. This suggests that ignoring movements back home may generate a skewed picture of the total insurance provided by parents and may indicate that youths from the poorest household are much less well-insured than they actually are.
All of the above features are consistent with the cost for parents of removing the various insurance channels, reported in Table 11 . The cost for parents of removing the option to move back home is comprised of two e¤ects: a direct e¤ect from altruism with regards to youths'lower consumption plus an indirect e¤ect on parental consumption that arises from larger …nancial transfers. 38 To gain some intuition for the value of parents as insurance, it is useful to examine the value of more traditional insurance channels. In the fourth row of Tables 10 and 11, I report the percentage drop in consumption that is equivalent to restricting the youths from being able to save. Note that in principal, savings could occur in the model due to lifecycle, patience or precautionary reasons. However since (i) the estimated annual discount factor (0:865) is smaller than the implied discount on savings (0:971); and (ii) the age-earnings pro…le is steeply upward sloping, the only substantial motive for savings is to smooth away shocks. As one would expect, the cost of not being allowed to save is large -equivalent to a drop in consumption of over 20%. Savings are a particularly important mechanism for smoothing consumption for youths from the lower parts of the income distribution.
The relative importance of parents versus savings increases with parental income. For richer parents, whose households are a more attractive place to live, savings are a relatively less important way to insure against shocks. However, for youths with poorer parents, savings are a more valuable insurance channel.
The …fth row of Tables 10 and 11 report the cost of removing the simple unemployment bene…ts in the model. For all but youths with the poorest parents, the option to move back home is more valuable than this unemployment insurance system. Finally, it is interesting to examine a related mechanism that youths have available to smooth the e¤ect of shocks: the choice of when to initially leave home. One way to interpret this is as an option to delay leaving home in the event that an adverse sequence of shocks is received while the youth is still living at home. To explore the importance of this I calculate the cost of moving to an alternate MPE in which youths are forced out of home at age 16, and are not permitted to return. Of course, this is very costly to youths: it is equivalent to a drop in consumption of over one-half. However, forcing youths out of home early is also extremely costly for parentsnot only for altruism reasons, but also because in the resulting equilibrium …nancial transfers increase.
The results in this section suggest that parents are indeed an important form of support for youths, and that shared coresidence is an integral component of this support. This is particularly true for youths that come from households in the bottom parts of the income distribution. Moreover, shared coresidence is an important form of support even after youths initially leave home, since the option to move back home remains. Ignoring parental coresidence can hence paint a misleading picture of the real amount of uninsured risk that young males face.
Results III: Impact on Individual Decisions
In this section I analyze how explicit consideration of parental coresidence decisions a¤ects the other economic choices that young people make. The …ndings suggest that ignoring this aspect of behavior can lead to misleading inferences about the behavior of youths. Moreover, I argue that allowing for parental coresidence decisions can help to account for number of otherwise puzzling aspects of youths' labor supply, savings and consumption behavior. Before addressing each of these, it is instructive to understand how the option to move back home a¤ects coresidence and transfer decisions themselves.
Coresidence and Transfers
Consider …rst how having the option to move back home a¤ects the initial decision to move out of home and the resulting pattern of parental transfers. The left hand panel of Figure 13 plots the fraction of youths living away from home in the baseline model (solid red line), with the option to move back removed (dash-dot blue line) and with both the option to move back and parental transfers removed (dashed green line). Without the option to move back, youths delay the decision to move out: the fraction of youths living away from home is lower than in the baseline at young ages. Since the decision to move out is …nal, youths are more cautious in moving out and require higher earnings and assets to warrant leaving the parental home. However, since living away is now an absorbing state, the fraction living away is substantially higher at older ages. Without parental transfers, the delay in moving out is exacerbated even further.
From the right panel of Figure 13 it is apparent that the fraction of youths who receive transfers is also higher when there is no possibility of moving back home (dash-dot blue line versus solid red line). This is especially true at older ages where parental transfers substitute for moving back home as a form of parental support when youths are hit with negative shocks. 39 The dashed green line in the same …gure shows the fraction of youths that receive transfers in the version of the model where coresidence is completely removed as a form of support. Not being allowed to optimally choose the age at which to move out leads to the receipt of parental transfers for an additional 15% of youths.
Labor Supply
How are patterns of labor supply a¤ected by the option to move back home? Moving out later and not being allowed to move back causes youths to shift their labor supply to slightly older ages. This can be seen from the left panel of Figure 14 , which shows the percentage deviation of the fraction of youths that are working, relative to the benchmark. The unemployment rate is 5% lower, and then increases to around 5% higher.
The reason for this is related to the delayed decision to move out of home. The combination of the fact that reservation wages are higher for youths who live at home and the fact that youths live at home longer, means that a smaller fraction of youths are employed at younger ages. However, once youths have moved out, they become less likely to quit in the event of a negative wage shock and are more likely to accept low-paying jobs if they become unemployed. Hence employment is higher than in the baseline environment at older ages. Even though monetary transfers increase (see Section 8.1) they do not increase enough to fully compensate for not being able to move back. This is especially true for youths with poorer parents.
Without the option to move back home, higher reservation wages when young and lower reservation wages when old lead to ‡atter age-earnings pro…les. This can be seen in the right panel of Figure 14 . Youths are less willing to accept jobs when they are young and living at home, and hence those that are employed have higher average earnings. When they are older, and living away from home without the option to move back, youths tend to accept lower-paying jobs which leads to lower average earnings.
The dashed green lines in Figure 14 show how labor supply and average earnings are a¤ected when …nancial transfers are the only available form of parental support. Without the ability to coreside, youths lower their reservation wages substantially, which shows up as an employment rate that is 20% to 50% higher than in the benchmark. The induced selection e¤ect reduces average earnings by 10% to 20%.
The extent to which labor supply decisions are a¤ected by movements in and out of the parental home can also be demonstrated by studying the labor supply elasticities that are implicit in the model. To do this, I de…ne two labor supply elasticities, which are calculated from simulated data under di¤erent scenarios. First, I de…ne the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the o¤ered wage, " w , as the average increase in the probability of working given a 1% increase in the o¤ered wage, conditional on having a job o¤er. Second I de…ne the elasticity of labor supply with respect to an o¤er, " o , as the probability of accepting an o¤er, conditional on receiving one while unemployed. The two elasticities can be described formally as follows:
" w : elasticity wrt o¤ered wage
" w is calculated by regressing h it 2 f 1; 0; 1g on log w it " o : elasticity wrt to an o¤er
as an indicator variable for whether individual i had a wage o¤er in period t. " o is calculated by regressing h it on D it I calculate " w and " o for three groups: the whole population, individuals at home in t 1, and individuals away at t 1. The results are shown in Table 12 for (i) the baseline model; (ii) the model without the option to move back home; and (iii) the model in which coresidence is ignored altogether.
The most important feature to note is the di¤erence in the two elasticities for youths at home versus youths away from home, both with and without option to move back. The elasticity with respect to the o¤ered wage, " w , indicates that labor supply responds much more to a change in the o¤ered wage for youths living at home than for those living away: 0:178 vs 0:027 in the benchmark model. However the elasticity with respect to an o¤er, " o , indicates that the probability of accepting an o¤er is much higher for youths away than for youths at home: 0:786 vs 0:308.
These two …ndings are consistent with each other. In the model, youths who live away from home have low reservation wages, hence those with o¤ers are generally already working. Labor supply is thus largely una¤ected by a change in the o¤ered wage. Moreover those that are not working are likely to accept any o¤er that they receive. However, for youths at home, there is signi…cantly more scope for labor supply to respond to changes in wage o¤ers, since a non-trivial fraction of wage o¤ers are rejected. Together, this suggests that allowing for parental coresidence may lead to substantially higher e¤ective labor supply elasticities than if youths are assumed to not have the option of living with their parents. 40 The e¤ect is most prominent in the bottom row of Table 12 when shared residence is removed altogether as a form of parental support. Here " w is substantially lower and " o substantially higher than in the baseline model.
Savings
An indirect way of measuring the insurance value of being able to move back home is to examine the extent to which precautionary savings increase when the option to move back home is removed. In other words, one can ask how much youth's own savings decisions are distorted by the presence of their parents as a form of insurance. Figure 15 plots youths'average asset levels without the option to move back home (dash-dot blue line) and ignoring coresidence altogether (dashed green line), relative to the benchmark equilibrium.
The e¤ect on savings of removing these insurance channels is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, because there is one less insurance channel present, there is an incentive for youths to accumulate more assets. The ‡atter earnings pro…les also contribute to this e¤ect. On the other hand, without the possibility of sharing residence in the event of an adverse shock, youths must make greater use of their own assets to smooth consumption, so total asset levels may be lower. Figure 15 shows that without the option to move back, youths initially accumulate assets that are 10% higher on average than in the benchmark, due to the additional precautionary motive. However as they get older, these assets are run down to smooth the e¤ect of shocks that would otherwise have been insured by moving back home. By age 22, assets are lower on average by 5%. 41 Moreover, the dashed green line indicates that without the possibility of delaying moving out until su¢ cient assets have been accumulated, average savings are 30% 50% lower than in the benchmark.
Consumption Inequality
In many environments, one statistic that is particularly informative as to the extent of risksharing is the evolution of within-cohort consumption inequality. 42 . Although there has been an extensive debate 43 in the literature over the size of the rise in consumption inequality over the lifecycle, the existing literature has ignored inequality in consumption at young ages. This omission is mostly due to the fact that the literature has measured age as the age of the head of the household in which an individual lives. 44 Since most youths between the ages of 16 and 23 are living in households headed by their parents, they are necessarily ignored. This subsection contributes to the literature by (i) documenting a hump-shaped pattern of consumption inequality over this age-range, using data from the CEX; and (ii) providing an explanation in terms of parental coresidence outcomes.
The left panel of Figure 16 shows the variance of log consumption per adult equivalent for individuals aged 17 to 22, relative to age 17. The graph shows the pattern of inequality for two de…nitions of consumption from the CEX: non-durable, and non-durable plus imputed services from vehicles and housing. The third line in the graph is the analogous variance from the benchmark model. Both the data and the model exhibit a distinct hump-shape in consumption inequality over these ages.
The reason for the hump-shape is as follows. Initially, virtually all youths live at home, so the 4 1 In the model with Pareto-e¢ cient allocations, youth's assets remain higher than in the benchmark all the way up to age 22. This is because …nancial transfers are larger when they are determined e¢ ciently, rather than unilaterally by parents, as in the game.
4 2 See for example (Deaton and Paxson, 1994) , (Blundell and Preston, 1998) and (Heathcote et al., 2007) 4 3 Some contributions include (Deaton and Paxson, 1994) , (Slesnick and Ulker, 2004) , and (Heathcote et al., 2005) .
4 4 An exception is work in progress by Kaplan and Violante (2008) .
level of consumption inequality re ‡ects the level of consumption inequality of their parents. As the youths get older they start to move out of home, which increases the variance of consumption, since the level of consumption is in general higher in parental households than in households headed by youths. As more and more youths start to live away from their parents, inequality decreases substantially. In fact, in the CEX, this decrease continues well into the late twenties. 45 Only then does the permanent income hypothesis take over and inequality begins to rise again, as described by (Deaton and Paxson, 1994) . These e¤ects are clearly illustrated in the right panel of Figure 16 . This …gure plots consumption inequality for all youths, as well as separately for youths living away and youth living at home. Note that initially consumption inequality is higher at home than away -the youths living at home represent youths from all parental backgrounds, whereas those living away are those who have the highest earnings and assets. As more and more youths move out, and continue to get hit by shocks, consumption inequality increases for this group -a pattern that is consistent with the CEX when restricted to heads of households only. An important extension for future work would be to use the di¤ferences in the age-inequality pro…les at an individual and a household level as a measure of the overall amount of insurance provided by endogenous household formation. 46 
Conclusions
TO BE WRITTEN
A Data and Sample Selection [TO BE WRITTEN] B Pareto-E¢ cient Allocations
[TO BE COMPLETED]The set of Pareto-e¢ cient allocations between parents and youths, taking prices and stochastic processes as given can be described as the solution to the following set of problems
) where~ = + , and is a Pareto weight placed on the lifetime utility of the youth. Note that any combination of 1 ; 1 that sum to~ generate identical allocations, implying that there is no meaningful distinction between the Pareto weight and the altruism factor when allocations are determined in this way. Hence, I de…ne the problem in terms of~ and estimate this parameter directly, making no attempt to decompose it into a Pareto weight and an altruism factor. For a given modi…ed pareto weight, the e¢ cient allocation can be expressed recursively with a t ; z t ; w t ; r t 1 as state variables. In this case we can think of a representative family member who makes the residence, labor supply, transfer and savings choice. The solution is characterized by 4 choice-speci…c value functions, re ‡ecting the value of choosing di¤erent residence/labor supply combinations and optimally choosing savings and the transfer. Can be expressed in terms of an Euler equation, a transfer optimality condition and partitions of the state space. Note that there may be non-convexities due to the future discreet choices which need to be taken care of when solving the model.
In general, such allocations are not unique -there are a continuum of outcomes corresponding to the various pareto weights that can be placed on the two youths. To choose a particular point on the Pareto frontier, I estimate the pareto weight along with the other structural parameters. Note that in computing the e¢ cient allocations, I take no stand on how such allocations may be implemented. One approach is to view these allocations as those resulting from an assumption of perfect and full commitment to a set of fully state contingent arrangements that are negotiated between youths and parents once and for all at the beginning of time. Whether or not such allocations could in fact be implemented as the outcome of as strategic arrangements, perhaps as a reputational equilibrium, is not discussed here. I consider the e¢ cient allocations as a natural benchmark environment.
C A Static Game
[TO BE COMPLETED] The purpose of this appendix is to describe the structure and Nash equilibria of a static version of the stage game in the full model. This done in order to motivate the particular sequential version of the game that is used for estimation. Consider a static version of the game in which youth income is exogenous, there is no …xed cost of moving out and there are no savings. In this simpli…ed version of the game the only actions are the residential choice r 2 f0; 1g for the youth and the transfer amount, T 2 [0; I p ] for the parent. The payo¤s in this game are given by:
Youth:
The best response for a parent if the youth chooses to live away is given by:
In the special case where u ( ) is CRRA with coe¢ cient , the optimal transfers is
If the youth lives at home, all announced transfers are equivalent since no transfers are made when r = 0. The value of living away for you who receives transfers T is given by
and the value for the parent is given by
The value of living at home for a youth is given by
Living away from home (r; T ) = (1; T ) is a Nash equilibrium if the youth prefers to live away with T than at home:
However there are also a continuum of other equilibria (0; T ) in which the youth lives at home. De…neT as the minimum transfer required by the youth such that he prefers to live away rather than at home:
is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover it is not always the case that one of these equilibria Pareto dominates the others. This happens whenever (1) holds the youth prefers the away equilibrium and the parent prefers the home equilibrium. This happens if
The two conditions hold together whenever
which is always an open interval. The Nash equilibrium in which the youth lives at home has the ‡avor of the parent threatening to cut-o¤ the youth if they move out. As a result the youth stays at home. Note however, that in this case if the youth were to unilaterally move out, the threatened low transfer would not be credible. Instead it would be in the parent's interest to provide the transfer T >T . Intuitively once can think of parents who continue to make signi…c Fraction ever away 50% (47%; 53%) Fraction ever moved back, conditional 44% on ever living away (39%; 48%) Median duration back home 11 (9; 13) Other Moments: mean, variance log earns fraction away from home fraction receiving transfers mean, variance log entry earns mean growth rate in fraction away mean log assets at age 20 growth mean log earns mean duration spells back home mean unemployment duration fraction ever moved back prob start work auto-correlation coresidence prob stop work di¤: mean log earns, home vs away prob earnings change mean log earns change fraction not working 
